



Day 1 – Session 2b CEQ Effectiveness Indicators

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Effectiveness

An indicator that you typically would think of:

∆Gini/Spending

Problem: Fiscal interventions of larger size would d worse by definition because higher spending results in incrementally lower declines in Gini => leads to improper ranking of fiscal interventions



Effectiveness

Desirable properties:

- Ranks interventions properly
- Be within a certain range (i.e., between 0 and 1 or
 -1 and 1)
- Intuitively appealing interpretation
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Reminder: How to Calculate the Marginal Contribution

 Let's use an example: Marginal Contribution of Direct Taxes to the inequality of Disposable Income

Market Income-Direct Taxes+Direct Transfers=Disposbale Income

- Two important Income concepts:
 - Disposable Income without Direct Taxes (before)
 - Market Income + Direct Transfers, or
 - Disposable Income + Direct Taxes.
 - Disposable Income (after)
- Marginal Contribution of the Direct Taxes:

 $MC\downarrow Direct\ Taxes \uparrow Disposable\ Income = Gini \downarrow Disposable\ Income \setminus Direct\ Taxes - Gini \downarrow Disposable\ Income$

■ Direct Taxes are equalizing if MC\Direct Taxes\Disposable Income > 0



CEQ Effectiveness Indicators

- General Indicators:
 - 1. Impact Effectiveness
 - 2. Spending Effectiveness
- Poverty-Specific Indicators:
 - 3. Fiscal Impoverishment and Gains Effectiveness



1. Impact Effectiveness (1)

For Inequality Indices (e.g. Gini):

Impact Effectiveness $\downarrow T$ (and/o r B) $\uparrow End$ income = $MC \downarrow T$ (and/o r B) $\uparrow End$ income $/MC \downarrow T$ (and/o r B) $\uparrow End$ income $\uparrow *$

where $MC\downarrow T$ (and/o r B) $\uparrow End$ income $\uparrow *$ is the maximum possible $MC\downarrow T$ (and/o r B) $\uparrow End$ income if the same amount of T (and/or B) is distributed differently among individuals.

- For Poverty Indices (e.g. Poverty headcount ratio):
 - > Transfers: Above formula is applicable.
 - > Taxes:

Poverty Impact Effectiveness \downarrow T \uparrow End income =-MC \downarrow T \uparrow End income / MC \downarrow T \uparrow End income \uparrow H

 $MC\downarrow T\uparrow End\ income\ \uparrow H$ is the Marginal Contribution of a tax if it is redistributed in the worst possible way.



1. Impact Effectiveness (2)

- This Indicator is always between -1 and +1 and the higher its value, the better it is.
- It is interpreted as the relative realized power of a tax, a transfer or a combination of taxes and transfers in reducing inequality or poverty (with the exception of taxes in the case of poverty).
- In the context of poverty and only for the taxes, the interpretation is as follows: the relative realized power of a tax to hurt the poor. The more negative the indicator is, the more potential for harm is realized.
- For example: if in the context of inequality, the impact effectiveness of a transfer is equal to 0.7, it means the transfer has realized 70% of its potential power in reducing inequality.



1. Impact Effectiveness (3)

| | | Impact Effectiveness with respect to: | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|---------|--------------|--|
| Fiscal Incident | | Disposable Income Consumable Income Final Income | | Final Income | |
| Direct Taxes and Contributions | Income Tax | 0.3287 | 0.3547 | 0.4048 | |
| | Employee contributions to the health insurance | 0.0838 | 0.0789 | 0.1246 | |
| | Employer contributions to the health insurance | 0.2214 | 0.2267 | 0.2383 | |
| | Employee contributions to the Social Security | 0.1479 | 0.1195 | 0.1718 | |
| | Employer contributions to the Social Security | 0.3178 | 0.3354 | 0.3056 | |
| | Total Direct Taxes and Contributions | 0.2564 | 0.2540 | 0.2871 | |
| Direct Transfers | Targeted Subsidy Program | 0.3880 | 0.3936 | 0.3839 | |
| | Social Assistance | 0.4250 | 0.4369 | 0.4490 | |
| | Semi-cash Transfers (Food) | -0.0214 | -0.0245 | -0.0319 | |
| | Total Direct Transfers | 0.4194 | 0.4239 | 0.4110 | |
| Indirect Taxes (Sales Taxes) | | - | -0.1395 | -0.1303 | |
| In-kind Transfers | Education Transfers | - | - | 0.2327 | |
| | Education User-fees | - | - | 0.1630 | |
| | Health Transfers | - | - | 0.3287 | |
| | Health User-fees | - | - | -0.2490 | |

Note: The Gini coefficient is the index used to calculate the effectiveness indicator here.



2. Spending Effectiveness (1)

It is only applicable to the taxes and transfers with <u>positive</u>
 Marginal Contribution.

Spending Effectiveness $\downarrow T$ (and/or B) $\uparrow End$ income = $T\uparrow *$ (and/or $B\uparrow *$)/T (and/or B) ,

where T1* (and/or B1*) is the minimum amount of Tax (or Benefit) that is needed to create the same $MC\downarrow T$ (and/or B) $\uparrow End$ income.

- This Indicator is always between 0 and +1 and the higher its value, the better it is.
- It has an efficiency interpretation: How much less distortionary taxes and transfers is needed to achieve the same social goal (in terms of the inequality or poverty index of interest).





2. Spending Effectiveness (2)

| Fiscal Incident | | Spending Effectiveness with respect to: | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---|-------------------|--------------|
| | | Disposable Income | Consumable Income | Final Income |
| | Income Tax | 0.3693 | 0.3709 | 0.3918 |
| | Employee contributions to the health insurance | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Employer contributions to the health insurance | 0.1855 | 0.1872 | 0.2223 |
| Direct Taxes and Contributions | Employee contributions to the Social Security | 0.1237 | 0.1211 | 0.1392 |
| | Employer contributions to the Social Security | 0.2843 | 0.2825 | 0.2932 |
| | Total Direct Taxes and Contributions | 0.2475 | 0.2439 | 0.2633 |
| | Targeted Subsidy Program | 0.2863 | 0.2887 | 0.2675 |
| | Social Assistance | 0.4147 | 0.4199 | 0.4132 |
| Direct Transfers | Semi-cash Transfers (Food) | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| | Total Direct Transfers | 0.2966 | 0.2993 | 0.2784 |
| Indirect Taxes (Sales Taxes) | | - | N/A | N/A |
| | Education Transfers | - | - | 0.1761 |
| | Education User-fees | - | - | 0.1413 |
| In-kind Transfers | Health Transfers | - | - | 0.2722 |
| | Health User-fees | - | - | N/A |

Note: The Gini coefficient is the index used to calculate the effectiveness indicator here. Fiscal interventions with an N/A are the ones with a negative marginal contribution which it is mathematically impossible to calculate the spending effectiveness for them10



3. Fiscal Impoverishment and Gains Effectiveness (1)

- It is only applicable to the poverty indicators.
- It uses two concepts introduced in Higgins and Lustig (2016):
 - Fiscal Impoverishment (FI): How much the poor individuals are made worse off by a fiscal system.
 - Fiscal Gains to the Poor (FGP): How much the poor individuals are made better off by a fiscal system.

Higgins, Sean, and Nora Lustig. "Can a poverty-reducing and progressive tax and transfer system hurt the poor?." Journal of Development Economics 122 (2016): 63-75.



3. Fiscal Impoverishment and Gains Effectiveness (2)

For a fiscal system (composed of taxes and transfers):

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Effectiveness \downarrow FI/FGP = [(B/T+B)(FGP\_MC \downarrow B \uparrow End income /B)] + [(T/T+B)(1-FI\_MC \downarrow T \uparrow End income /T)]
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Where T and B are the size of total taxes and transfers (both positive values), $FGP_MC \downarrow B \uparrow End \ income$ is the marginal contribution of transfer B to FGP (always a non-negative value) and $FI_MC \downarrow T \uparrow End \ income$ is the marginal contribution of tax T to FI (always a non-negative value).

For individual taxes and transfers:

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Tax\ Effectiveness \downarrow FI = T - FI\_MC \downarrow T \uparrow End\ income\ /T
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Transfer Effectiveness \downarrow FGP=FGP_MC \downarrow B \uparrow End income /B



3. Fiscal Impoverishment and Gains Effectiveness (3)

| | | \$4PPP FI-FGP Effectiveness with respect to: | | |
|-------------------------|--|--|--------|--|
| Fiscal Incident | | Disposable Income Consumable Income | | |
| | Income Tax | 0.9994 | 0.9987 | |
| | Employee contributions to the health insurance | 0.9921 | 0.9895 | |
| Direct Taxes and | Employer contributions to the health insurance | 0.9981 | 0.9971 | |
| Contributions | Employee contributions to the Social Security | 0.9956 | 0.9943 | |
| | Employer contributions to the Social Security | 0.9995 | 0.9991 | |
| | Total Direct Taxes and Contributions | 0.9976 | 0.9969 | |
| | Targeted Subsidy Program | 0.1297 | 0.1441 | |
| | Social Assistance | 0.1813 | 0.2050 | |
| Direct Transfers | Semi-cash Transfers (Food) | 0.0342 | 0.0385 | |
| | Total Direct Transfers | 0.1422 | 0.1569 | |
| Indirect Taxes (Sales T | direct Taxes (Sales Taxes) - 0.9 | | 0.9587 | |
| Total System | | 0.4094 | 0.4829 | |

Thank you!



Reference

• Higgins, Sean, and Nora Lustig. "Can a poverty-reducing and progressive tax and transfer system hurt the poor?." Journal of Development Economics 122 (2016): 63-75.