

Fiscal Redistribution in Low and Middle Income Countries

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Lustig, Nora, editor, *Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty*, Brookings Institution Press and Tulane University, forthcoming.



- Comprehensive standard fiscal incidence analysis of current systems
- Harmonized definitions and methodological approaches to facilitate cross-country comparisons
- Uses income/consumption per capita as the welfare indicator
- Allocators vary => full transparency in the method used for each category, tax shifting assumptions, tax evasion
- Secondary sources are used to a minimum

Lustig and Higgins, The CEQ Assessment: Measuring the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty ." Chapter in Lustig (editor) *Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty*, Brookings Institution Press and Tulane University, forthcoming.




CEQ Assessment: Fiscal Interventions

- Currently included:
 - Direct taxes
 - Direct cash transfers
 - Non-cash direct transfers such as school uniforms and breakfast
 - Contributions to pensions and social insurance systems
 - Indirect taxes on consumption
 - Indirect subsidies
 - In-kind transfers such as spending on education and health
- Working on:
 - Corporate taxes

CEQ Assessment: Income Concept







Fiscal Incidence in CEQ Assessments

- Accounting approach
 - no behavioral responses
 - no general equilibrium effects and
 - no intertemporal effects
 - but it incorporates assumptions to obtain economic incidence (not statutory)
- Point-in-time
- Mainly average incidence; a few cases with marginal incidence

Lustig and Higgins,"The CEQ Assessment: Measuring the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty ." Chapter in Lustig (editor) *Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, Brookings Institution* Press and Tulane University, forthcoming.



Monetizing in-kind transfers

- Incidence of public spending on education and health followed so-called "benefit or expenditure incidence" or the "government cost" approach.
- In essence, we use per beneficiary input costs obtained from administrative data (and scale them down) as the measure of average benefits.
- This approach amounts to asking the following question:
 - How much would the income of a household have to be increased if it had to pay for the free or subsidized public service at the full cost to the government?




Commitment to Equity Institute (CEQI)

Objective: To measure the impact of fiscal policy on inequality and poverty across the world

- Research-based policy tools
- Data Center
- Advisory and training services
- Bridges to policy

➢ Grant from Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation US4.9 million for 5 yrs



www.commitmentoequity.org



Three main messages from theory

1. Analyzing the tax side without the spending side, or vice versa, is useless

- ➤Taxes can be unequalizing but spending so equalizing that the unequalizing effect of taxes is more than compensated (we knew this...)
- Taxes can be regressive (Kakwani index) but when combined with transfers and other taxes, the fiscal system is more equalizing than without the regressive taxes (Lambert, 2001) (surprised?)

➢ VAT in Chile

Transfers can be progressive (Kakwani index) but when combined with taxes and other transfers, the fiscal system is more unequalizing with the progressive pensions than without them (generalizing Lambert) (surprised?)

> Contributory pensions in Colombia

Enami, Lustig and Aranda. "Analytical Foundations: Measuring the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty." Chapter in Lustig (editor) *Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty,* Brookings Institution Press and Tulane University, forthcoming.



2. Analyzing the impact on inequality only can be misleading

Fiscal systems can be equalizing but poverty increasing (surprised?)

- 3. Analyzing the impact on traditional poverty indicators can be misleading
- Fiscal systems can show a reduction in poverty (headcount ratio, gap or squared gap) ...
-and yet a substantial share of the poor could have been impoverished by the combined effect of taxes and transfers (surprised?)

Lustig and Higgins, "The CEQ Assessment: Measuring the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty ." Chapter in Lustig (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, Brookings Institution Press and Tulane University, forthcoming.



Lustig, Nora. 2016. "Fiscal Policy, Inequality, and the Poor in the Developing World." Tulane University, Economics Working Paper 1612, October.

https://ideas.repec.org/p/tul/wpaper/1612.html




- Empirical results for 25 countries based on fiscal incidence studies from the Commitment to Equity Institute for around 2010
 - Two low-income countries: Ethiopia (Hill et al., 2016) and Tanzania (Younger et al., 2016)
 - Nine lower middle-income countries: Armenia (Younger and Khachatryan, 2016), Bolivia (Paz-Arauco et al., 2014), El Salvador (Beneke, Lustig and Oliva, 2014), Ghana (Younger et al., 2015), Guatemala (Cabrera, Lustig and Moran, 2015), Honduras (Castañeda and Espino, 2015), Indonesia (Afkar et al., 2016), Sri Lanka (Arunatilake et al., 2016), and Tunisia (Shimeles et al., 2016)
 - Eleven upper middle-income countries: Brazil (Higgins and Pereira, 2014), Colombia (Lustig and Melendez, 2016), Costa Rica (Sauma and Trejos, 2014), Dominican Republic (Aristy-Escuder et al., 2016), Ecuador (Llerena et al., 2015), Georgia (Cancho and Bondarenko, 2016), Jordan (Alam et al., 2016), Mexico (Scott, 2014), Peru (Jaramillo, 2014), Russia (Lopez-Calva et al., 2016), and South Africa (Inchauste et al., 2016)
 - Two high-income countries: Chile (Martinez-Aguilar et al., 2016), and Uruguay (Bucheli et al., 2014).
 - One unclassified: Argentina (Rossignolo, 2016),



SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND SPENDING




More social spending, more redistribution



Source: Lustig (2016) ¹⁵




Social spending/GDP increases with income (Gross National Income per capita)



Source: Lustig (2016)




Direct transfers/GDP vs. GNI per capita




Source: Lustig (2016) ¹⁷

Education spending/GDP vs. GNI per capita






Health spending/GDP vs. GNI per capita







Composition of total government revenues as a share of GDP (circa 2010)




Source: Lustig (2016) 20



Composition of social spending as a share of GDP (circa 2010)

(ranked by social spending plus contributory pensions / GDP; GNI right hand scale)



Source: Lustig (2016)


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FISCAL REDISTRIBUTION

CEQ Assessment: Income Concepts








Inequality


Fiscal Policy and Inequality – Contributory pensions as deferred income



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Fiscal Policy and Inequality – Contributory pensions as direct transfers





Redistributive effect

(Change in Gini points: market income plus pensions and market income to disposable income, circa 2010)

(ranked by redistributive effect (left hand scale); Gini coefficients right hand scale) Dominican Republic (2013) United States Rolli south Africa (2010) Guatemala (2011) Heavedortooth Costa Rica (2010) Argentina (2012) Honduras 2011 colombia 20101 moonesial20121 Tantania (2011) Srilanka 20101 Armenia (2011) Uruguay 20091 Ethiopis 2011 Ecuador 2011 Georgia 20131 Wexico 2010 Tunisatolol Bolivia 20091 Russia 20101 Brail 20091 Chile 20131 Perul20091 0.00 0.90 -0.02 0.80 -0.04 0.70 -0.06 0.60 -0.08 0.50 -0.10 0.40-0.12 0.30 -0.14 0.20 -0.16 0.10 -0.18 -0.20 0.00

Contributory pensions as deferred income

Gini market income plus pensions


Redistributive effect-market income to disposable

Contributory pensions as direct transfer

▲ Gini market income




More unequal, more social spending/GDP No "Robin Hood Paradox"



Source: Lustig (2016) 28



More unequal, more redistribution No "Robin Hood Paradox"





In sum...

• In NO country, inequality increases as a result of taxes, subsidies and social spending

➢ Fiscal policy is always equalizing

>The more unequal, the more fiscal redistribution



Which fiscal instruments are equalizing and which are not?

- Rely on the sign of the "marginal contribution"
- The marginal contribution equals the difference in the reduction in inequality observed without the fiscal instrument of interest (and all the others in place) and with it (and all the others in place)
 - Positive means it is equalizing
 - Negative means it is unequalizing
 - Zero means it leaves inequality unchanged
 - The following tables uses the change in Gini points to measure fiscal redistribution

Marginal Contributions (contributory pensions as deferred income) – Low-income and lower-middle-income economies

	Low- income Economies	Lower-middle-income economies								
	Tanzania (2011)	Armenia (2011)	Bolivia (2009)	El Salvador (2011)	Ghana (2013)	Indonesia (2012)	Sri Lanka (2010)			
Redistributive effect (from Gini										
market income plus pensions to										
<i>final</i> income)	0.0534	0.1125	0.0646	0.0356	0.0349	0.0238	0.0278			
Marginal contribution										
Direct taxes	-0.0012	0.020		0.0039	-0.0057	0.0000	0.0025			
Direct transfers	0.0009	0.091	0.0099	0.0057	0.0011	0.0037	0.0041			
Indirect taxes	0.0175	0.000	0.0004	0.0012	0.0016	-0.0022	0.0006			
Indirect subsidies	-0.0033	-0.001	0.0004	0.0011	-0.0008	0.0014	0.0051			
Education	0.0116	0.013	0.0340	0.0141	0.0085	0.0194	0.0105			
Health	0.0016	0.003	0.0237	0.0105	0.0073	0.0031	0.0056			
Kakwani										
Direct taxes	0.4789	0.096		0.3574	not available		0.5458			
Direct transfers	0.2791	0.660	0.0713	0.5001	0.8066	0.6397	0.7572			
Indirect taxes	0.0992	-0.129	-0.1259	-0.0182	0.0021	-0.0420	-0.0063			
Indirect subsidies	-0.2126	0.381	0.1311	0.1666	-0.0115	0.0560	0.3056			
Education	0.2641	not available	0.5076	0.5655	not available	0.3630	0.3892			
Health	0.2064	0.500	0.5360	0.3126	not available	0.2730	0.3963			
Relative size										
Direct taxes	1.3%	4.5%		1.7%	4.6%		0.5%			
Direct transfers	0.4%	18.4%	2.1%	1.2%	0.2%	0.7%	0.6%			
Indirect taxes	13.1%	12.0%	7.8%	7.3%	6.3%	6.8%	7.4%			
Indirect subsidies	1.2%	0.0%	0.7%	0.9%	2.1%	8.2%	2.0%			
Education	7.5%	3.1%	7.7%	2.6%	6.0%	6.2%	3.2%			
Health	2.3%	1.5%	5.2%	3.6%	3.1%	1.6%	1.6%			
All taxes – all transfers	3.1%	-6.5%	-7.9%	0.8%	-0.5%	-9.8%	0.4%			

The unequalizing effect appear in red font and cases where microdata is unavailable and mc is calculated based on the information by deciles are highlighted in blue.

Source: Lustig (2016)



Marginal Contributions (contributory pensions as deferred income) – Uppermiddle-income and high-income economies

	Upper-middle-income Economies								High-income Economies			
	Brazil (2009)	Colombia (2010)	Costa Rica (2010)	Ecuador (2011)	Georgia (2013)	Jordan (2010)	Mexico (2010)	Peru (2009)	Russia (2010)	South Africa (2010)	Chile (2013)	Uruguay (2009)
Redistributive effect (from Gini market income plus												
pensions to <u>final</u> income)	0.1221	0.0677	0.1307	0.0747	0.1244	0.0230	0.0831	0.0418	0.0629	0.1758	0.0740	0.1018
Marginal contribution												
Direct taxes	0.0143	-0.0003	0.0139	0.0047	0.0221	0.0071	0.0151	0.0061	0.0139	0.0430	0.0120	0.0186
Direct transfers	0.0148	0.0057	0.0095	0.0157	0.1002	0.0052	0.0094	0.0044	0.0203	0.0517	0.0190	0.0199
Indirect taxes	0.0113	-0.0004	0.0118	0.0062	-0.0141	-0.0014	0.0053	0.0069	-0.0009	0.0127	0.0040	0.0019
Indirect subsidies	0.0005	0.0049		0.0056	0.0004	0.0042	0.0032		0.0001		0.0023	
Education	0.0509	0.0268	0.0393	0.0283	0.0199	0.0155	0.0326	0.0175	0.0207	0.0490	0.0321	0.0289
Health	0.0292	0.0265	0.0342	0.0119	0.0077	-0.0087	0.0163	0.0084	0.0127	0.0433	0.0135	0.0348
Kakwani												
		not										
Direct taxes		available	0.1052	0.4017	0.1819			0.3853	0.1042	0.1254		0.2245
Direct transfers	0.5069	0.7831	0.9104	0.8385	0.7063		0.7931	0.9612	0.5927	1.0421	0.8243	0.9367
Indirect taxes	-0.0179	-0.0961	0.0053	0.0363			0.0129	0.0527	-0.0724	-0.0828	-0.0273	-0.0753
Indirect subsidies	0.8373	0.5316		0.2131	0.3716	0.1512	0.2457		0.2128		0.4969	
Education	0.7087	not available	0.5644	0.6930	0.5414	0.4784	0.5816	0.6566	0.4978	0.8169	0.6641	0.5888
Health	0.6914	not available	0.5442	0.5910	0.6360	0.0557	0.4608	0.3109	0.3740	0.8275	0.5930	0.5813
Relative size												
Direct taxes	4.2%	0.2%	6.6%	1.6%	9.8%	1.3%	5.0%	1.4%	0.0704	15.0%	2.3%	6.1%
Direct transfers	5.1%	0.9%	1.3%	2.1%	19.4%	1.3%	1.3%	0.5%	0.0467	5.4%	2.7%	2.3%
Indirect taxes	12.9%	1.9%	10.0%	6.3%	12.8%	3.1%	6.0%	7.6%	0.0803	14.1%	10.3%	7.9%
Indirect subsidies	0.1%	1.1%		4.1%	0.4%	3.5%	2.0%		0.0009		0.5%	
Education	10.6%	4.7%	8.7%	4.6%	4.3%	3.6%	6.3%	2.7%	0.0445	6.9%	5.2%	5.6%
Health	4.8%	7.1%	8.0%	2.4%	1.9%	3.4%	4.3%	2.9%	0.0419	5.5%	3.2%	6.8%
All taxes - all transfers	-3.6%	-11.7%	-1.5%	-5.4%	-3.4%	-7.5%	-2.9%	2.9%	0.0169	11.2%	1.0%	<u>_</u> -0.8%

Unequalizing effect appears in red font.

Source: Lustig (2016)

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In sum...

- Direct taxes are equalizing except in Colombia, Ghana and Tanzania (surprised?)
- Direct transfers are always equalizing (phew!)
- Indirect taxes are more often than not equalizing (surprised?), except in Colombia, Georgia, Indonesia, Jordan and Russia
- Indirect subsidies are more often than not equalizing (surprised?), except in Armenia, Ghana, and Tanzania
- Education and health spending are always equalizing



Poverty




- Fiscal policy can be equalizing but poverty increasing (in terms of the poor's ability to consume private goods and services):
 - ➤1.25/day line: Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Tanzania
 - 2.50/day line: Armenia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Tanzania
 - ≻4/day line: all of the above plus Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Tunisia
- This worrisome result stems mainly from consumption taxes

Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduction




(Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Consumable Income (Poverty line \$1.25 / day 2005 ppp; Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income; in %)



Source: Lustig (2016)

Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduction

(Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Consumable Income (Poverty line \$2.50 / day 2005 ppp; Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income; in %)




Source: Lustig (2016)



Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduction




(Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Consumable Income (Poverty line \$4.00 / day 2005 ppp; Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income; in %)



Net payers and net receivers (by decile; Contributory pensions as deferred income)



Net receivers Net payers



Source: Lustig (2016)



Net payers and net receivers (by income groups; Contributory pensions as deferred income)


			Net re	eceivers 🛛 💻 Net p	ayers	
Indonesia (2012)			ļ	ļ		
Jordan (2010)						
Ecuador (2011)						
Brazil (2009)						
Uruguay (2009)						
Tunisia (2010)			1			
South Africa (2010)			I			
Russia (2010)			1			
Mexico (2010)			I			
Georgia (2013)			1			
Costa Rica (2010)			<u> </u>			
Colombia (2010)						
Chile (2013)			1			
			1			
Argentina (2012)			1			
Sri Lanka (2010)			1			
Peru (2009)						
El Salvador (2011)						
Dominican Republic (2013)						
Honduras (2011)						
Bolivia (2009)						
Guatemala (2011)						
Ethiopia (2011)						
Armenia (2011)						
Tanzania (2011)						
Ghana (2013)			l I	 		
	y<1.25	1.25<=y<2.5	2.5<=y<4	4<=y<10	10<=y<50	y>=50
				9	Source: Lustig	(2016) 41



Analyzing the impact on traditional poverty indicators can be misleading

Fiscal systems can show a reduction in poverty and yet a substantial share of the poor could have been impoverished by the combined effect of taxes and transfers





Higgins and Lustig. 2016. Can a poverty reducing and progressive tax and transfer system hurt the poor? *Journal of Development Economics* 122, 63-75, 2016



Domestic Resource Mobilization and the Poor

How frequently fiscal systems may be inequality reducing but at the same time leave the poor worse off in terms of their purchasing power of private goods and services?

Fiscal Impoverishment (Market to Consumable Income)



Country (survey year)	pensions Poverty headcount (%)	headcour t (p.p.)	income plus n pensions inequality (Gini)		(▲Gini)	as % of population	Fiscally Impoverished as % of consumable income poor
Panel A: Upper-middle	income cou	ntries, usii	ng a poverty l	ine of \$2.5 Z	oos ppp per	aay	
Brazil (2009)	16.8	-0.8	57.5	4.6	-3.5	5.6	34.9
Chile (2013)	2.8	-1.4	49.4	3.2	-3.0	0.3	19.2
Ecuador (2011)	10.8	-3.8	47.8	3.5	-3.3	0.2	3.2
Mexico (2012)	13.3	-1.2	54.4	3.8	-2.5	4.0	32.7
Peru (2011)	13.8	-0.2	45.9	0.9	-0.8	3.2	23.8
Russia (2010)	4.3	-1.3	39.7	3.9	-2.6	1.1	34.4
South Africa (2010)	49.3	-5.2	77.1	8.3	-7.7	5.9	13.3
Tunisia (2010)	7.8	-0.1	44.7	8.0	-6.9	3.0	38.5
Brazil (2009)	16.8	-0.8	57.5	4.6	-3.5	5.6	34.9
Chile (2013)	2.8	-1.4	49.4	3.2	-3.0	0.3	19.2

Higgins and Lustig (2016)

Fiscal Impoverishment (Market to Consumable Income)



Country (survey year)	pensions Poverty headcount (%)	poverty headcoun t (p.p.) t	income plus pensions inequality (Gini)	Reynolds- Smolensky	(▲Gini)	as % of population	Fiscally Impoverished as % of consumable income poor
Panel B:Lower-middle	ncome co	untries, usi	ing a povert	ty line of \$1.2	ן 2005 PPP ן 5 2005	er day	
Armenia (2011)	21.4	-9.6	47.4	12.9	-9.3	6.2	52.3
Bolivia (2009)	10.9	-0.5	50.3	0.6	-0.3	6.6	63.2
Dominican Republic (2013)	6.8	-0.9	50.2	2.2	-2.2	1.0	16.3
El Salvador (2011)	4.3	-0.7	44.0	2.2	-2.1	1.0	27.0
Ethiopia (2011)	31.9	2.3	32.2	2.3	-2.0	28.5	83.2
Ghana (2013)	6.0	0.7	43.7	1.6	-1.4	5.1	76.6
Guatemala (2010)	12.0	-0.8	49.0	1.4	-1.2	7.0	62.2
Indonesia (2012)	12.0	-1.5	39.8	1.1	-0.8	4.1	39.2
Sri Lanka (2010)	5.0	-0.7	37.1	1.3	-1.1	1.6	36.4
Tanzania (2011)	43.7	7.9	38.2	4.1	-3.8	50.9	98.6

Higgins and Lustig (2016)



- Fifteen of the eighteen countries with a <u>reduction</u> in poverty and inequality due to the tax and transfer system experienced various degrees of fiscal impoverishment.
- In ten countries—Armenia, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia between one-quarter and two-thirds of the post-fisc poor lost income to the fiscal system.
- In the three countries where the headcount ratio rose (Ethiopia, Ghana and Tanzania), the proportion of the poor who were impoverished by the fiscal system is staggering (above 75 percent).
- In Armenia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Tunisia, and Russia, between 25 and 50% are still fiscally impoverished when the monetized value of education and health services are included as transfers



- Extreme care must be taken with emphasizing domestic resource mobilization to achieve SDGs
- Must assess the impact on the poor of tax and subsidy reforms, otherwise one may be taking away from the poor more than is transferred to them
- Impact on the poor of increasing taxes requires the use of adequate indicators; conventional measures of inequality and poverty can be *awfully* misleading
- Fiscal Impoverishment Index fulfills all the requirements to obtain an accurate assessment of the impact of fiscal changes on the poor



How pro-poor is spending on education and health



Classification

A = Pro-poor and equalizing, per capita spending declines with income

B = Neutral in absolute terms and equalizing, same per capita for all

C = Equalizing but not pro-poor, per capita spending as a share of market income declines with income

D = Unequalizing, per capita spending as a share of market income increases with income



Progressivity and pro-poorness of education and health spending -Low-income economies

Low-income Economies	Edu	ucat	tion	Pre	e-scl	hool	P	rima	ary	Sec	ond	lary		Tert	tiary	/	Н	ealt	th
	A	В	С	A	В	С	Α	В	С	A	В	С	Α	В	С	D	Α	В	С
Ethiopia (2011)			+					+				+				+			+
Tanzania (2011)				+			+				+					+			+

-- = not available



Progressivity and pro-poorness of education and health spending -Lower-middle-income economies

Lower-middle- income Economies	Edu	ıcat	tion	Pre	e-scl	nool	Pr	·ima	ry	Sec	ond	ary		Ter	tiary	y	H	leal	th
	Α	В	С	Α	В	С	Α	В	С	Α	В	С	Α	В	С	D	Α	В	С
Armenia (2011)	+			+			+								+			+	
Bolivia (2009)		+		+			+			+					+			+	
El Salvador (2011)	+			+			+				+				+				+
Ghana (2013)				+			+				+					+		+	
Guatemala (2011)		+		+			+				+					+			+
Honduras (2011)		+		+			+				+				+			+	
Indonesia (2012)		+					+				+				+				+
Sri Lanka (2010)		+													+			+	
Tunisia (2010)		+													+			+	

-- = not available



Progressivity and pro-poorness of education and health spending – Upper-middle-income economies

Upper-middle-																					
income					Pre	_															
Economies	Edu	JCa	tion	S	cho	ol	Pr	Primary Secon				dary		Ter	tiar	y	Health				
	Α	В	С	Α	В	С	Α	В	С	Α	В	С	Α	В	С	D	Α	В	С	D	
Brazil (2009)	+			+			+			+					+		+				
Colombia (2010)				+			+			+					+						
Costa Rica (2010)				+			+			+					+						
Dominican Republic																					
(2013)	+			+			+								+		+				
Ecuador (2011)	+						+					+					+				
Georgia (2013)		+			+										+		+				
Jordan (2010)	+			+			+			+					+				+		
Mexico (2010)	+			+			+			+					+			+			
Peru (2009)	+			+			+			+					+				+		
Russia (2010)																					
South Africa (2010)		+		+			+			+					+		+				

-- = not available



Progressivity and pro-poorness of education and health spending – High-income economies

High-income Economies	Edu	Education			Pre-		Pr	rima	iry	Sec	ond	lary		Tert	tiary	Health			
	A	В	С	A	В	С	A	В	С	A	В	С	Α	В	С	D	Α	В	С
Argentina (2012)*	+			+											+		+		
Chile (2013)	+			+			+			+					+		+		
Uruguay (2009)	+			+			+			+					+		+		

-- = not available

* unclassified



Main results

- Education spending on primary and secondary schooling per person tends to decline with income ("pro-poor") or be the same across the income distribution...
- ➤... with the exception of Ethiopia where although equalizing, per capita spending on secondary education increases with income

Are middle-classes opting out in middle and high income countries?

Tertiary education spending is not pro-poor but it is equalizing except for Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala and Tanzania, where it is unequalizing



Main results

- Health spending per person tends to decline with income ("pro-poor") or be the same across the income distribution....
- …except for El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, Peru and Tanzania where although not unequalizing per capita spending increases with income.



In conclusion...

- Fiscal systems are always equalizing but can often reduce the purchasing power of the poor
 - Warning: unintended consequence of the domestic resource mobilization agenda can be making the poor worse off
- Spending on education and health is often pro-poor and almost universally equalizing
 - Warning: is this favorable result because middle-classes and the rich are opting out?
- Reassuring results
 - Redistributive effect increases with social spending
 - Social spending as a share of GDP increases with inequality
 - The more unequal, the more redistribution



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Thank you!