Fiscal policy and Income Redistribution in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay

Nora Lustig
Tulane University
CGD and IAD

XXVIII SEMINARIO REGIONAL DE POLITICA FISCAL
CEPAL
Santiago, Chile, March 16-17, 2016
Source:

Study prepared for the División de Administración Fiscal y Municipal of the Inter-American Development Bank
Commitment to Equity Institute (CEQI)

- Research-based policy tools
- Data Center
- Advisory and training services
- Bridges to policy

- Grant from Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
  US$4.9 million for 5 yrs
CEQ Institute: Core Staff

• Director: Nora Lustig
• Director of Policy Area: Ludovico Feoli
• Associate Directors: Maynor Cabrera, Jon Jellema, Estuardo Moran and Stephen Younger
• Technical Coordinator: Sandra Martinez
• Data Center Director: Sean Higgins
• Communications Director: Carlos Martin del Campo
Commitment to Equity Institute

- Working on close to 40 countries; covers around two thirds of the world population
- Over 100 collaborators
- Collaborative efforts and partnerships with multiple organizations: AfDB, CAF, IDB, IMF, ICEFI, OECD, Oxfam, UNDP, World Bank
- Utilized by governments
- Working Paper series and numerous scholarly publications
www.commitmenttoequity.org
CEQ Assessment: Tools

- **Handbook**: Lustig and Higgins, current version Sept 2013, updated Feb 2016; includes sample Stata code
- **CEQ Handbook 2016 (forthcoming)**
- **Master Workbook**: Excel Spreadsheet to present background information, assumptions and results.
- **Diagnostic Questionnaire**: available on website
- **Ado Stata Files**
CEQ Assessment: Method

- Relies on state-of-the-art tax and benefit incidence analysis
  - Ongoing consultation with experts to improve economic incidence estimates
- Uses conventional and newly developed indicators to assess progressivity, pro-poorness and effectiveness of taxes and transfers
- Allows to identify the contribution of individual fiscal interventions to equity and poverty reduction objectives

Lustig & Higgins (2013)
CEQ Assessment: Fiscal Incidence Analysis

\[ Y_h = I_h - \sum_i T_i S_{ih} + \sum_j B_j S_{jh} \]

- Income after taxes and transfers
- Taxes
- Transfers
- Income before taxes and transfers
- Share of tax \( i \) paid by unit \( h \)
- Share of transfer \( j \) received by unit \( h \)
CEQ Assessment: Fiscal Interventions

• Currently included:
  – Direct taxes
  – Direct cash transfers
  – Non-cash direct transfers such as school uniforms and breakfast
  – Contributions to pensions and social insurance systems
  – Indirect taxes on consumption
  – Indirect subsidies
  – In-kind transfers such as spending on education and health

• Working on:
  – Corporate taxes
  – Housing subsidies

Lustig & Higgins (2013)
CEQ Assessment: Income Concepts

MARKET INCOME

PLUS DIRECT TRANSFERS MINUS DIRECT TAXES

DISPOSABLE INCOME

PLUS INDIRECT SUBSIDIES MINUS INDIRECT TAXES

POST-FISCAL or CONSUMABLE INCOME

PLUS MONETIZED VALUE OF PUBLIC SERVICES: EDUCATION & HEALTH

FINAL INCOME
Fiscal Incidence in CEQ Assessments

- Accounting approach
  - no behavioral responses
  - no general equilibrium effects and
  - no intertemporal effects
  - but it incorporates assumptions to obtain economic incidence (not statutory)

- Point-in-time

- Mainly average incidence; a few cases with marginal incidence

Lustig & Higgins (2013)
Fiscal Incidence in CEQ Assessments

- Comprehensive standard fiscal incidence analysis of current systems: direct personal and indirect taxes (no corporate taxes); cash and in-kind transfers (public services); indirect subsidies
- Harmonized definitions and methodological approaches to facilitate cross-country comparisons
- Uses income/consumption per capita as the welfare indicator
- Allocators vary => full transparency in the method used for each category, tax shifting assumptions, tax evasion
- Secondary sources are used to a minimum

Lustig & Higgins (2013)
Allocation Methods

- Direct Identification in microdata
  - However, results must be checked: how realistic are they?

- If information not directly available in microdata, then:
  - Simulation
  - Imputation
  - Inference
  - Prediction
  - Alternate Survey
  - Secondary Sources

Lustig & Higgins (2013)
Tax Shifting Assumptions

• Economic burden of direct personal income taxes is borne by the recipient of income
• Burden of payroll and social security taxes is assumed to fall entirely on workers
• Consumption taxes are assumed to be shifted forward to consumers.
• These assumptions are strong because they imply that labor supply is perfectly inelastic and that consumers have perfectly inelastic demand
• In practice, they provide a reasonable approximation (with important exceptions such as when examining effect of VAT reforms), and they are commonly used

Lustig & Higgins (2013)
Tax Evasion Assumptions: Case Specific

- Income taxes and contributions to SS:
  - Individuals who do not participate in the contributory social security system are assumed not to pay them

- Consumption taxes
  - Place of purchase: informal markets are assumed not to charge them
  - Some country teams assumed small towns in rural areas do not to pay them

Lustig & Higgins (2013)
Monetizing in-kind transfers

- Incidence of public spending on education and health followed so-called “benefit or expenditure incidence” or the “government cost” approach.
- In essence, we use per beneficiary input costs obtained from administrative data as the measure of average benefits.
- This approach amounts to asking the following question:
  - How much would the income of a household have to be increased if it had to pay for the free or subsidized public service at the full cost to the government?

Lustig & Higgins (2013)
Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions

• Deferred income in actuarially fair systems: pensions included in market income and contributions treated as mandatory savings

• Government transfer: pensions included among direct transfers and contributions treated as a direct tax

Lustig & Higgins (2013)
Scenarios and Robustness Checks

- Benchmark scenario
- Sensitivity to:
  - Changing the original income by which hh are ranked: e.g., market income plus contributory pensions and disposable income
  - Using consumption vs. income
  - Per capita vs. equivalized income or consumption
  - Different assumptions on scaling-down or up
  - Different assumptions on take-up of transfers and tax shifting and evasion
  - Alternative valuations of in-kind services
  - Other sensitivity scenarios: country-specific

Lustig & Higgins (2013)
FISCAL POLICY, INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN LATIN AMERICA: HIGHLIGHTS
Teams and references by country:
(in parenthesis: survey year; C=consumption & I=income)

1. **Argentina** (2012-13; I) Rossignolo, Darío. 2016. CEQ Masterworkbook, CEQ Institute, Tulane University (February 28, 2016)


Household Surveys Used in Country Studies

1. **Argentina**: National Household Survey on Incomes and Expenditures 2012-13 (ENGHo) (I)
2. **Bolivia**: Encuesta de Hogares, 2009 (I)
3. **Brazil**: Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares, 2009 (I)
4. **Chile**: Encuesta de Caracterización Social (CASEN), 2009 (I)
5. **Colombia**: Encuesta de Calidad de Vida, 2010 (I)
6. **Costa Rica**: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, 2010 (I)
7. **Ecuador**: Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares Urbano y Rural, 2011-2012 (I)
8. **El Salvador**: Encuesta De Hogares De Propósitos Multiples, 2011 (I)
10. **Guatemala**: Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos Familiares, 2010 (I)
11. **Honduras**: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPEM), 2011 (I)
12. **Indonesia**: Survei Sosial-Ekonomi Nasional, 2012 (C)
13. **Mexico**: Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares, 2010 (I)
14. **Peru**: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, 2009 (I)
15. **South Africa**: Income and Expenditure Survey and National Income Dynamics Study, 2010-2011 (I)
17. **Uruguay**: Encuesta Continua de Hogares, 2009 (I)

Note: The letters "I" and "C" indicate that the study used income or consumption data, respectively.
SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND SPENDING
Government Revenues

Composition of Total Government Revenues as share of GDP (circa 2010)
(ranked by total government revenue/GDP; GNI right hand scale)

GNI per capita for Argentina in 2005 PPP
Source: Lustig (2015b)
Public Spending

Primary and Social Spending as share of GDP (circa 2010)
(rank by primary spending/GDP, GNI right hand scale)

GNI per capita for Argentina in 2005 PPP
Source: Lustig (2015b)
Size and Composition of Government Budget

Composition of Social Spending
(rank by social spending/GDP; GNI right hand scale)

GNI per capita for Argentina in 2005 PPP
Source: Lustig (2015b)
FISCAL POLICY AND INEQUALITY
CEQ Assessment: Income Concepts

1. MARKET INCOME
2. PLUS DIRECT TRANSFERS MINUS DIRECT TAXES
3. DISPOSABLE INCOME
4. PLUS INDIRECT SUBSIDIES MINUS INDIRECT TAXES
5. POST-FISCAL or CONSUMABLE INCOME
6. PLUS MONETIZED VALUE OF PUBLIC SERVICES: EDUCATION & HEALTH
7. FINAL INCOME
Fiscal Redistribution

Market, Disposable, Consumable and Final Income Gini (circa 2010)
(Contributory Pensions as deferred Income)

Ginis for Chile are estimated using Total Income. Official figures of inequality are estimated using Monetary Income
Source: Lustig (2016)
Fiscal Redistribution

Market, Disposable, Consumable and Final Income Gini (circa 2010)
(Contributory Pensions as Transfer)

Ginis for Chile are estimated using Total Income. Official figures of inequality are estimated using Monetary Income.
Source: Lustig (2016)
Redistributive Effect

Change in Gini points: Market to Disposable Income (circa 2010)

The Gini coefficients for the United States are for equivalized income. Ginis for Chile are estimated using Total Income. Official figures of inequality are estimated using Monetary Income.

Source: Lustig (2016)
Main messages

- Extent of redistribution very heterogeneous:
  From Argentina (similar to the European Union) to Honduras (negligible)

- Contributory Pensions can be equalizing or unequalizing (Colombia, Honduras, Mexico)

Lambert, 2001; Lustig et al., forthcoming
Table 4: Marginal Contribution of Taxes and Transfers (circa 2010) (Pensions as Market Income)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marginal Contributions</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile*</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Indonesia**</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>SA***</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Market to Disposable Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Redistributive Effect</strong></td>
<td>0.0453</td>
<td>0.0340</td>
<td>0.0075</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
<td>0.0236</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
<td>0.0788</td>
<td>0.0291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct taxes</td>
<td>0.0148</td>
<td>0.0154</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0131</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
<td>0.0269</td>
<td>0.0129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct transfers</td>
<td>0.0320</td>
<td>0.0190</td>
<td>0.0057</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
<td>0.0109</td>
<td>0.0045</td>
<td>0.0593</td>
<td>0.0194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Market to Post-fiscal Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Redistributive Effect</strong></td>
<td>0.0446</td>
<td>0.0370</td>
<td>0.0073</td>
<td>0.0061</td>
<td>0.0308</td>
<td>0.0151</td>
<td>0.0789</td>
<td>0.0314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct taxes</td>
<td>0.0171</td>
<td>0.0179</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0140</td>
<td>0.0060</td>
<td>0.0311</td>
<td>0.0147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct transfers</td>
<td>0.0382</td>
<td>0.0220</td>
<td>0.0057</td>
<td>0.0043</td>
<td>0.0113</td>
<td>0.0048</td>
<td>0.0711</td>
<td>0.0225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect taxes</td>
<td>-0.0014</td>
<td><strong>0.0027</strong></td>
<td>-0.0017</td>
<td>-0.0028</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
<td><strong>0.0000</strong></td>
<td>0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect subsidies</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
<td>0.0047</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakwani</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct taxes</td>
<td>0.1738</td>
<td>0.3481</td>
<td>0.1373</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.2411</td>
<td>0.3853</td>
<td>0.1109</td>
<td>0.1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct transfers</td>
<td>0.5310</td>
<td>-0.9064</td>
<td>0.9233</td>
<td>0.6248</td>
<td>0.7931</td>
<td>0.9612</td>
<td>1.0165</td>
<td>0.8223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect taxes</td>
<td>-0.0536</td>
<td>-0.0172</td>
<td>-0.1986</td>
<td>-0.0513</td>
<td>0.0129</td>
<td>0.0527</td>
<td><strong>-0.0788</strong></td>
<td>-0.0477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect subsidies</td>
<td>0.8295</td>
<td>0.7978</td>
<td>0.5034</td>
<td>0.0645</td>
<td>0.2457</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.3487</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lustig (2016)
Main messages

Analyzing the tax side without the spending side, or vice versa, is not very useful

- A tax can be regressive but when combined with transfers make the system more equalizing than without the regressive taxes: e.g, VAT in Chile
- Transfers can be equalizing but when combined with taxes, post-fisc poverty can be higher

Lambert, 2001; Lustig et al., forthcoming
FISCAL POLICY AND POVERTY REDUCTION
Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduction

Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Consumable Income
(Poverty line $2.50/day 2005ppp; Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income; in %)

Source: Lustig (2016)
Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduction

Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Consumable Income
((Poverty line $2.50/day 2005ppp; Contributory Pensions Transfers; in %)

Source: Lustig (2016)
Main messages

Analyzing the impact on inequality only can be misleading

- Fiscal systems can be equalizing but poverty increasing: Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras

Lustig, forthcoming
Fiscal Impoverishment and Fiscal Gains to the Poor

Higgins and Lustig (2015)
# Fiscal Impoverishment

($1.25/day PPP 2005, Market to Consumable Income)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Market income + pensions poverty headcount</th>
<th>FI headcount (among whole population)</th>
<th>FI headcount among post fiscal poor</th>
<th>FI per impoverished as proportion of income</th>
<th>Poverty went up or down?</th>
<th>Unambiguously progressive?</th>
<th>Inequality went up or down?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia (2009)</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (2009)</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (2013)</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador (2011)</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador (2011)</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (2010)</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (2012)</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru (2011)</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DOWN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Higgins and Lustig (2015)
Main messages

Analyzing the impact on traditional poverty indicators can be misleading

- Fiscal systems can show a reduction in poverty and yet a substantial share of the poor could have been impoverished by the combined effect of taxes and transfers (in Bolivia and Guatemala the share is over 60 percent)

Higgins and Lustig (2015)
## Progressivity of Education Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Pro-poor CC is negative</th>
<th>Educ Total</th>
<th>Pro-poor CC is negative</th>
<th>Pre-school</th>
<th>Pro-poor CC is negative</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Pro-poor CC is negative</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Pro-poor CC is negative</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina (2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia (2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (2009)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (2013)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (2010)</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica (2010)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador (2011)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador (2011)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (2011)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras (2011)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (2010)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru (2009)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay (2009)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lustig (2016)
# Progresivity of Health Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (Year)</th>
<th>Pro-poor CC is negative</th>
<th>Health Same per capita for all; CC =0</th>
<th>Progressive CC positive but lower than market income Gini</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina (2012)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia (2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (2009)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (2013)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (2010)</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica (2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador (2011)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador (2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (2011)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras (2011)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (2010)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru (2009)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay (2009)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lustig (2016)
Main messages

- Education spending per person tends to decline with income (“pro-poor”) or be the same across the income distribution
  - Middle-classes opting out?
- Tertiary education spending is equalizing except for El Salvador and Guatemala
- Health spending per person tends to decline with income (“pro-poor”) or be the same across the income distribution, except for El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru where although not unequalizing per capita spending increases with income

Higgins and Lustig (2015)
References

References


• Llerena Pinto, Freddy Paul, María Christina Llerena Pinto, Roberto Carlos Saá Daza, and María Andrea Llerena Pinto. 2015. Social Spending, Taxes and Income Redistribution in Ecuador. CEQ Working Paper No. 28, Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and Department of Economics, Tulane University and Inter-American Dialogue, February.
References


- Lustig, Nora. 2015b. Lustig, Nora. 2015b. Inequality and Fiscal Redistribution in Middle Income Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru and South Africa. Evidence from the Commitment to Equity Project (CEQ). CEQ Working Paper No. 31, Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and Department of Economics, Tulane University and Inter-American Dialogue. Accepted in Journal of Globalization and Development.

References

• Lustig, Nora, editor. Commitment to Equity Handbook: Estimating the Redistributive Impact of Fiscal Policy. (Forthcoming)


Thank you!